Javier Corrales

Amherst College

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PhD. en Ciencia Política Universidad de Harvard

 

Líneas de Investigación: Política comparada de América Latina; Reformas económicas y de políticas públicas

 

Publicaciones Recientes:

(2010). Introduction:  The Comparative Politics of Sexuality in Latin America (with Mario Pecheny). In Javier Corrales and Mario Pecheny, eds.  The Politics of Sexuality in Latin America (University of Pittsburgh Press).

(2010). Latin American Gays:  The Post-Left Leftists, in  Americas Quaterly.

(2010).Relations between the United States and Venezuela, 2001-2009 (with Carlos A. Romero).  In Jorge I. Domínguez and Rafael Fernández de Castro, eds.  Contemporary U.S. Latin American Relations (Routledge).

(2010). The Repeating Revolution:  Chávez's New Politics and Old Economics, in Kurt Weyland, Raúl L. Madrid, and Wendy Hunter, eds., Leftist Governments in Latin America (Cambridge University Press).

(2009). Venezuela's Foreign Policy:  Using Social Power to Balance Soft Power.  Washington Quarterly 32, 4 (October):97-114.

(2009). ¿Qué es el populismo?  [What is populism?].  La Nación (San José de Costa Rica), November 29

 (2009). Venezuela:  Petro-Politics and the Promotion of Disorder.   In Freedom House, Undermining Democracy; 21st-century authoritarianism (New York, Freedom House).

(2009).  Volatilidad económica, debilidad de partidos y neocaudillismo en América Latina.  Journal of Democracy en español (julio).

(2009).  Gays in Latin America:  Is the Closet Half-Empty.  Foreign Policy, February, Web Exclusive. 

(2006). Information Technology Adoption and Political Regimes.  International Studies Quarterly (with Frank Westhoff).

The Venezuelan political regime today: strengths and weaknesses

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Javier Corrales/Amherst College

 

The Chávez regime constitutes what political scientists often call a hybrid regime—it is not democratic, but it is not hard-core authoritarian either, at least not yet. Instead of abolishing checks-and-balances institutions, the regime packs them with loyalists. Instead of repressing dissidents, it practices job discrimination against voters. Instead of banning civic protests, it organizes counter-mobilizations by inciting and organizing mobs. Instead of disbanding organized opposition parties, it denies them resources. Instead of eliminating elected offices, it creates parallel, undemocratic units of government. Instead of shutting down the press, it burdens them with regulations and, through media buyouts, reduces the private media’s share of the market. Instead of suspending elections, it promotes abstentionism of would-be opponents by failing to guarantee the secrecy of the vote. Compared to the most repressive regimes of the 20th century, the Chávez regime is relatively innocuous. But compared to most Latin American countries today, where indices of political and civil liberties are historically high, the Chávez regime is certainly the least pluralistic in the region after Cuba.

 

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The many lefts of Latin America

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Javier Corrales/Amherst College

 

For half a decade now, the headlines from Latin America have touted the rise of the Latin left. As leftists have moved off the streets and into government in Bolivia, Brazil, Venezuela, and elsewhere, however, the story line has changed. The vision of a united leftist coalition of Latin nations opposing the United States and free market reforms is an illusion. Instead, intense fights have broken out within the left as protest movements struggle to govern. The Latin American “left,” it is nowclear, actually comprises a wide range of movements with often conflicting goals.

The Revolutionaries: These are the old radicals who have not changed much since the 1960s. They share an angry romanticism and a strong dislike of markets and institutions. “¡Qué se vayan todos!”—“Let’s get rid of everyone”—is their slogan, and it became a refrain during the 1999 Constitutional Assembly in Venezuela, the 2001 financial crisis in Argentina, and the 2003 street protests in Bolivia.

 

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The Gatekeeper State: limited economic reforms and regime survival in Cuba, 1989–2002

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Javier Corrales/Amherst College

 

The continuity of the Cuban political regime in the 1990s has amazed most Cubanologists of every persuasion (e.g., Hawkins 2001; Suchlicki 2000; Aguirre 2000; Dilla 1997; Bengelsdorff 1994; Ritter 1994; Domínguez 1993b). Despite the demise of dictatorships in Latin America and most of the Soviet Bloc, Cuba’s regime has remained unabashedly authoritarian. This continuity in politics contrasts with the discontinuities in economics. Between 1993 and 1996, Cuba opened new sectors to foreign direct investment (FDI), liberalized farm markets, legalized the possession of U.S. dollars and new forms of self-employment, and reduced the fiscal deficit by cutting spending. Compared to economic reforms elsewhere in Latin America, Cuba’s reforms were timid. Cuba fell short of privatizing any state-owned enterprises, liberalizing financial markets, and permitting full-scale profit making, as most aggressive reformers in Latin America did in the 1990s. Cuba also fell short in comparison to Communist China and Vietnam in the 1990s, which allowed the rise of a private business sector (see Brundenius and Weeks 2001). However, compared to the Revolution’s own past, Cuba’s economic reforms were profound.

 

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Technocratic policy making and parliamentary accountability in Argentina, 1983–2002

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Javier Corrales/Amherst College

 

Many new democracies in the 1990s developed highly technocratic ministries of the economy. These ministries became powerful and assertive actors, bombarding the legislatures with com-plex bills. Unless they develop comparable levels of technical capacity, legislatures are at a dis-advantage in evaluating these bills, and thus in holding the executive branch accountable. The result is a deficit of horizontal accountability.  This paper examines the factors that propel legislatures to develop technical and oversight capacity. Most studies of legislative oversight focus on institutional rules or the career paths of politicians. This paper supplements these approaches by focusing on a set of factors that have received less attention: the strategies adopted by political parties for dealing with the executive. A typology of different strategies, and how each might affect congressional development, are presented and tested against the Argentine case, 1983–2002.

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Regimes of cooperation in the Western Hemisphere: power, interests and Intellectual Traditions

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Javier Corrales/Amherst College

 

The 1994 Summit of the Americas marked a high point in hemispherism –our label for the active attempt by the nations of the Western Hemisphere has not been a more powerful trend in the last 200 years, structural, interest, and cultural variables are relevant but insufficient factors. An important and often overlooked obstacle to hemispherism has been contrarian ideas. Specifically, constellations of intellectual traditions that question the value of hemispheric cooperation have dampened both the demand for and supply of such regimes. Only when these antihemispheric intellectual traditions were in retreat- the late nineteenth century, the mind twentieth century, and the early 1990s- has hemispherism flourished. We posit three mechanism through which intellectual traditions can decline, thus generating a modified cognitivist argument that can supplement power-based and interest-based explanations of regime formation and robustness.   

 

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